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SEARCHES OF THE PERSON INCIDENT TO
TRAFFIC ARRESTS: STATE AND
FEDERAL APPROACHES
On April 19, 1968, Officer Richard Jenks of the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police Department stopped a 1965 Cadillac driven by
Willie Robinson, Jr., for a "routine spot check." Officer Jenks allowed
Robinson to continue on his way after carefully taking note of a discrepancy between the "1938" date of birth on Robinson's temporary operator's permit and the "1927" date of birth on his selective service classification card. An examination of police traffic records revealed the
reason for the discrepancy: Robinson's operator's permit had been revoked and he had subsequently obtained a new permit by giving a different birth date. Four days later Officer Jenks again saw Robinson
driving the Cadillac. The officer stopped him and, after being shown
the same temporary permit as he had seen on the previous occasion,
placed Robinson under arrest for operating a motor vehicle after revocation of his operator's permit and obtaining a permit by misrepresentation.' Police department regulations required a full custodial arrest,
rather than the mere issuance of a citation,2 and a full field search before transporting the prisoner to the stationhouse,3 where he could post
bond and avoid further detention.4 During the course of his search
of Robinson, Officer Jenks felt an object in the left breast pocket of
Robinson's heavy coat, which he removed. The object was a
"crumpled up cigarette package" which Officer Jenks could determine
by feeling did not contain cigarettes. Officer Jenks opened the package
and discovered fourteen gelatin capsules of heroin. 5 The heroin seized
from Robinson was later admitted into evidence at the trial which resulted in his conviction for possession and facilitation of concealment
of heroin. 6
A few months later, in the early morning hours of January 12,
1969, Lieutenant Paul R. Smith of the Eau Gallie, Florida, Police De1. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1088 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414
U.S. 218 (1973).
2. D.C. Metropolitan Police Dep't Gen. Order No. 3, Apr. 24, 1959, quoted in
part in United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1097-98 n.23 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
3.

471 F.2d at 1088.

4.

Id. at 1102-03 & nn.35-37.

5.

United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 222-23 (1973).

6.

Id. at 219, 223.
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partment observed a 1953 Cadillac bearing a New York license plate
weaving back and forth across the center line of the road. 7 After the
two occupants of the Cadillac looked back and apparently saw Lieutenant Smith's squad car, the Cadillac drove across the highway and behind
a grocery store to another city street. At this point Lieutenant Smith
stopped the car and asked the driver, James Gustafson, to produce his
operator's license. Gustafson told Lieutenant Smith that he was a student and that he had left his license in his dormitory room in neighboring Melbourne. Lieutenant Smith thereupon exercised his discretion,
as he frequently did in similar circumstances, 8 and placed Gustafson
under full custodial arrest for failing to have his license in his possession.' The purpose of the arrest was to transport Gustafson to the stationhouse for further inquiry. 10 Lieutenant Smith also exercised his
discretion in conducting a full search of Gustafson." From the left
front pocket of the coat Gustafson was wearing the officer extracted
a cigarette box which, when opened, was found to contain what appeared to be marijuana cigarettes.'12 These were subsequently used
in evidence at the trial at which Gustafson was convicted for unlawful
possession of marijuana."
Arrests for traffic offenses are, of course, not a new phenomenon.
Although they have been occurring for decades, until the recent cases
of United States v. Robinson 4 and Gustafson v. Florida, 5 described
above, the United States Supreme Court had never ruled on the permissible scope of a search of the person incidental to such an arrest. Holding these searches to be constitutional, the Court found a positive authority for the police to conduct a no-holds-barred search after any custodial arrest,'" ignoring the vast weight of state and federal judicial
opinion that the Fourth Amendment strictly limits such searches.' 7 In
so doing, the Court substantially diluted the protections which it is the
purpose of the Fourth Amendment to provide.
Alternative Approaches Available
Most modem state and lower federal courts faced with searches
based on arrests for traffic offenses have acknowledged that searches
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
414 U.S.
17.

Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
Id. 261-62, 265 n.3.
Id. at 262.
Id.
Id. at 263, 265.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 261.
414 U.S. 218 (1973).
414 U.S. 260 (1973).
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida,
260, 265-66 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 18-86 infra.
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of the person incident to arrest are an exception to the Fourth Amendment's requirement of a warrant"8 but have nevertheless recognized
that a lawful arrest by itself does not automatically justify all incidental
searches.' 9 To be constitutional, incidental searches must be reasonable."
Reasonableness manifestly cannot be determined in the abstract by a blanket statement covering all situations, but must be determined by reference to the particular factual situation in which the issue
arises. 2 The state and federal courts dealing with the traffic arrest
situation have tailored their tests of reasonableness accordingly.
18. The first major reference to the right to conduct a warrantless search of a person arrested was made in dictum in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914), in
which the Supreme Court stated, "What then is the present case? Before answering that
inquiry specifically, it may be well by a process of exclusion to state what it is not. It
is not an assertion of the right on the part of the Government, always recognized under
English and American law, to search the person of the accused when legally arrested
to discover and seize the fruits or evidences of crime. This right has been uniformly
maintained in many cases." Id. at 392. Although the precise locus of the origin of
the incidental searches doctrine is unknown, the existence of such an exception appears
undisputed. See Note, Searches of the Person Incident to Lawful Arrest, 69 COLUM.
L. REv. 866 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Searches of the Person].
19. See, e.g., Williams v. United States, 412 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1969) (dictum
as to searches of the person); United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir.
1969); Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Grundstrom
v. Beto, 273 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Tex. 1967) (dictum as to searches of the person); McCurdy v. State, 42 Ala. App. 646, 176 So. 2d 53 (1965) (dictum as to searches of the
person); State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d 130 (1962); People v. Superior Ct.,
7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972) (Simon); Cowdin v. People,
176 Colo. 466, 491 P.2d 569 (1971) (dictum as to searches of the person); State v.
Anonymous, 29 Conn. Supp. 153, 276 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct. 1971); People v. Watkins,
19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960); Williams v. State,
248 Ind. 66, 66-67, 222 N.E.2d 397, 398-403 (1966) (separate opinion), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 917 (1967); Commonwealth v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1971) (dictum
as to searches of the person); State v. Sedacca, 252 Md. 207, 249 A.2d 456 (1969) (dictum as to searches of the person); People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456
(1960); State v. Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971); People v. Marsh, 20
N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967); Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Crim.
299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953) (dictum as to searches of the person); State v. O'Neal, 251
Ore. 163, 444 P.2d 951 (1968); Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938)
(dictum as to searches of the person); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d
989 (1962) (dictum as to searches of the person); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130
N.W.2d 264 (1964). Contra, Watts v. State, 196 So. 2d 79 (Miss. 1967); State v. Giragosian, 107 R.I. 657, 270 A.2d 921 (1970); Lane v. State, 424 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. Crim.
1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 929 (1968).
20. Cf. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 147 (1925).
21. "What is a reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula.
The Constitution does not define what are 'unreasonable' searches and, regrettably, in
our discipline we have no ready litmus-paper test. The recurring questions of the reasonableness of searches must find resolution in the facts and circumstances of each
case." United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 63 (1950), quoting in part Go-Bart
Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344, 357 (1931).
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Any intrusion on individual privacy by way of search or seizure
is an evil which bears a heavy burden of justification. 22 The state and
federal courts which have expressly dealt with the problems of traffic
arrests have carefully limited incidental searches -to prevent arbitrary
and unnecessary exploratory searches.
Two standards have been developed to judge the reasonableness
of individual searches. The first focuses on the factual situation: if
the arresting officer has, independent of the mere fact of the arrest itself, probable cause to believe that a search of the person of the arrestee will uncover weapons, instrumentalities, evidence, or fruits of
crime, a search limited to these items will be reasonable. 23 Some
courts using this approach have distinguished between the evidentiary
and protective functions of incidental search and have permitted a weapons search without probable cause or with a lesser showing of cause.2 4
A second standard employed by a large number of courts focuses on
the nature of the offense: any search of the person is reasonable if
limited to instrumentalities, evidence, or fruits of the crime for which
Many of these courts permit weapons searches
the arrest is made.
to the crime charged.2 6
relationship
without regard to any
The Probable Cause Test
The Fourth Amendment provides that "no warrants shall issue,
but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized. '' 27 "Probable cause" is that quantum of evidence which
would justify a man of reasonable caution in believing that an offense
has been or is being committed2 8 and that the area to be searched contains material subject to seizure. 29 The purpose of the warrant requirement is to ensure a prior determination by a detached and neutral magistrate that a particular intrusion on individual privacy is reasonable.3 0
Despite the distrust of on-the-spot decisions by police officers evidenced by the warrant requirement,3 1 circumstances can justify dis22. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455 (1971); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
23. See text accompanying notes 27-50 infra.
24. See cases cited note 48 infra.
25. See text accompanying notes 51-67 infra.
26. See cases cited note 60 infra.
27. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
28. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 55 (1967).
29. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967).
30. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S.
523, 532-33 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966); Johnson v.
United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
31. Cf. Note, The Fourth Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.. 521,
529 (1968). The United States Supreme Court has noted the value of prior judicial
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pensing with a search warrant.3" An arrest is one such circumstance. "3
The arrest itself need not be supported by a warrant;"4 the general rule
is that a police officer may arrest a person without a warrant if he reasonably believes that person to be guilty of a felony or if the person
has committed a misdemeanor in his presence. 5 The reasonable belief test is the substantial equivalent of the probable cause requirement
of the Fourth Amendment.3 6
Those courts which have predicated the reasonableness of a search
incident to an arrest on the existence of probable cause to believe weapons, instrumentalities, evidence or fruits of the crime will be found 37 have
review of police searches: "The point of the Fourth Amendment, which often is not
grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies law enforcement the support of the usual
inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of
being judged by the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime." Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
"We are not dealing
with formalities. The presence of a search warrant serves a high function. Absent
some grave emergency, the Fourth Amendment has interposed a magistrate between the
citizen and the police. This was done not to shield criminals. . . . It was done so that
an objective mind might weigh the need to invade that privacy in order to enforce the
law. The right of privacy was deemed too precious to entrust to the discretion of those
whose job is the detection of crime and the arrest of criminals. Power is a heady thing;
and history shows that the police acting on their own cannot be trusted. And so the
Constitution requires a magistrate to pass on the desires of the police .......
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948).
32. E.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) (fear for the officer's safety); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (hot pursuit of a robbery suspect); Carroll v.
United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925) (possibility of automobile with contraband leaving
jurisdiction before warrant obtained).
33. At common law the fact of arrest alone did not justify a search of the person
without a warrant. Rather, whether such a search was lawful depended upon the particular circumstances of the case. More specifically, a search was permitted if necessary
to protect the officer or if there were evidence to seize. J. LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND
SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 98-99 (1966) [hereinafter cited as LANDYNSKI].
Cf.
Searches of the Person, supra note 18, at 868-69.
34. The lawfulness of an arrest is determined by state law rather than by reference
to the United States Constitution. Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301, 305 (1958).
35. Standards for warrantless arrests are usually set by statute in the United
States. The California statute is typical. It provides that an officer may make an arrest
without a warrant, (1) whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to
be arrested has committed a public offense in his presence, (2) when a person arrested
has committed a felony, although not in his presence, and (3) whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a felony, whether
or not a felony has in fact been committed. CAL. PEN. CODE § 836 (West 1970). A
public offense is defined as an act committed or omitted in violation of law to which
is annexed the punishment of death, imprisonment, fine, removal from office, or disqualification to hold any office of honor, trust or profit. Id. § 15.
36. Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310 n.3 (1959).
37. People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837
(1972); Cowdin v. People, 176 Colo. 466, 491 P.2d 569 (1971); Commonwealth v. Ha-

November 19741

SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST

imposed a dual burden of justification on the police: the arrest and the
subsequent search have been viewed as separate transactions, each of
which requires that the standard of probable cause be met. It is not sufficient that the initial intrusion by way of arrest is reasonable: each step
the police take must be reasonable, and the test of reasonableness must
be the same for each step. These courts have found that the probable
cause justification is the only constitutionally adequate substitute for a
prior judicial determination of reasonableness.
The probable cause approach ensures that the scope of a search
incidental to an arrest will be no greater than that which would be permitted under the authority of a search warrant. 38 Custody of the arrestee alone provides no justification for an unlimited search. 9
The probable cause standard may be characterized as a negative
command to the police: do not search, unless the search can be justified. Ordinarily the circumstances which give rise to an arrest will provide probable cause to believe that weapons, instrumentalities, evidence, or fruits of crime will be found in a search of the person arrested. 40 The same is certainly not true of traffic arrests :41 there are
no fruits of such offenses, and the only instrumentality or evidence is
the vehicle itself. 4 - Further, violation of a traffic ordinance does not,
in itself, provide probable cause to believe that weapons will be on the
person of the arrestee:
A motorist who exceeds the speed limit does not thereby indicate
any propensity for violence or iniquity, and the officer who stops
the speeder has not even the43slightest cause for thinking that he
is in danger of being assaulted.
For this reason, some courts have required additional circumstances began, 464 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1971); People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281
N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 442 Pa. 98, 275 A.2d 51 (1971).
38. This has the effect of preventing the search from becoming a general investigative technique, because at some point the conduct of the police will be reviewed by
a neutral magistrate to determine its reasonableness. See Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948); LANDYNSKI, supra note 33, at 116.
39. See State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 268, 376 P.2d 130, 131 (1962); People
v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 209, 496 P.2d 1205, 1222, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 854 (1972);
Commonwealth v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261, 264 (Ky. 1971); People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d
98, 101, 228 N.E.2d 783, 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789, 792 (1967).
40. This is probably the reason that searches of the person other than those based
on traffic or status crime arrests have not generally been challenged in the courts.
41. This is subject to the exception of arrests for driving under the influence of
alcohol or narcotics. E.g., People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 202 n.12, 496 P.2d
1205, 1216 n.12, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 848 n.12 (1972).
42. People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 201-02, 496 P.2d 1205, 1216-17, 101
Cal. Rptr. 837, 848 (1972); Searches of the Person, supra note 18, at 871.
43. People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 101, 228 N.E.2d 783, 786, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789,
792 (1967).
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yond the fact of the arrest itself to justify a search for weapons. 44 Some
of these courts, however, relax the normal probable cause standard in
determining the reasonableness of a weapons search. 4 5
Although a traffic violation provides no probable cause to believe
the arrestee is armed,
the dangers to which the police are exposed in the circumstances
of a custodial arrest are sharply accentuated by the prolonged proximity of the accused to police personnel following the arrest ....
[T]he crucial distinguishing feature of the in-custody arrest "is not
the greater likelihood that a person taken into custody is armed,
but rather the increased
' '46 likelihood of danger to the officer if in fact
the person is armed.
In balancing the need to protect the police officer against the right of
individual privacy, 47 a substantial number of courts have found the limited intrusion of a weapons search to be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.48
The probable cause standard presents no insurmountable obstacle
to police in justifying searches. 4 9 Additional circumstances can provide
the reason for a search, and courts have not always applied the most
rigorous standards in judging the validity of incidental searches. 50
44. E.g., State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d 130 (1962); People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972); People v. Marsh,
20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 442
Pa. 98, 275 A.2d 51 (1971).
45. E.g., People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789
(1967) (reason to believe arrestee committed more than mere traffic offense).
46. United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 1972), quoting
People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 214, 496 P.2d 1205, 1225, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837,
857 (1972) (Wright, C.J., concurring). One court waxed rather eloquent about the
need to permit a search: "It is not untenable that the respectable citizen who finds himself under lawful arrest may panic or attempt to escape or perhaps use a weapon, which
he might have lawfully in his possession, to harm the officer. The point is that no reason has been advanced why the officer should take the risk. . . . [Who would be willing to tell the widow of the dead police officer that was killed because a narrow view
of the Constitution deprived him of one of the means he has traditionally had for the
purpose of protecting himself?" State v. Coles, 20 Ohio Misc. 12, 19-20, 249 N.E.2d
553, 559 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County 1969).
47. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); Camara v. Municipal
Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 534 (1967). Although not specifically noting the elements indicated
here which seem to be appropriate factors to be considered in the balancing test, these
cases in general do approve of the balancing of interests approach.
48. E.g., State v. Coles, 20 Ohio Misc. 12, 249 N.E.2d 553 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery
County 1969); Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla. Crim. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); State v.
O'Neal, 251 Ore. 163, 444 P.2d 951 (1968); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d 116, 130 N.W.
2d 264 (1964).
49. See Note, The Supreme Court, 1966 Term, 81 HARv. L. REV. 69, 117-18
(1967) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Term].
50. See People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 194-97, 496 P.2d 1205, 1211-13,
101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 843-45 (1972).
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The Nexus Approach

A greater number of courts have viewed the search incident to

arrest exception as a limited grant of authority to the police to conduct
a search of the person for items related to the crime for which the arrest
is made.51

As long as -the nexus requirement is met-i.e., so long as

there is a reasonable relationship between the nature of the crime and
the scope of the search-no further justification for a search is necessary. 2 A search which has as its object the discovery of instrumentalities, evidence, or fruits of the crime for which the arrest is made is ipso

53
facto reasonable.

The courts have reasoned that because incidental searches are an

exception to the warrant requirement, "the scope of the search must
be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered

its initiation permissible." 54 Any search not related to the reason for
the arrest is impermissibly exploratory.
Searches of the area within the immediate control of the arrestee
have also been carefully delimited by the United States Supreme Court.
55
Such searches must be substantially contemporaneous with the arrest,
limited to "the area from within which [the arrestee] might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence," 56 and restricted in aim
to the discovery of weapons, instrumentalities, evidence, or fruits
of the crime."7 The courts which have adopted the relationship test
51. See, e.g., United States v. Humphrey, 409 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1969); Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Jack v. United States, 387
F.2d 471 (9th Cir. 1967); Grundstrom v. Beto, 273 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Tex. 1967);
McCurdy v. State, 42 Ala. App. 646, 176 So. 2d 53 (1965); People v. Watkins, 19 Ill.
2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433, cert. denied, 364 U.S. 833 (1960); Brinegar v. State, 97 Okla.
Crim. 299, 262 P.2d 464 (1953); State v. O'Neal, 251 Ore. 163, 444 P.2d 951 (1968);
Elliott v. State, 173 Tenn. 203, 116 S.W.2d 1009 (1938); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d
116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964).
52. Even courts utilizing the relationship test frequently emphasize other issues,
such as the pretextual nature of the arrest. E.g., Amador-Gonzalez v. United States,
391 F.2d 308, 314 (5th Cir. 1968); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 264-65
(9th Cir. 1961); Comment, Criminal Law: Personal Searches Incident to Traffic Arrests.-No Nexus Necessary?, 25 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 239, 242 (1972).
53. This categorical approach naturally simplifies the judicial review of police
searches, and puts police on surer footing when they are doubtful about the propriety
of a search which they wish to undertake, because common sense will dictate whether
or not there can exist material related to the crime for which arrest is made.
54. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968), quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.
294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring); People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 201,
496 P.2d 1205, 1216, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 848 (1972).
55. Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S.
483 (1964).
56. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
57. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S.
298, 310 (1921). Some courts, as previously indicated, have limited the search for
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as the constitutional standard of reasonableness have merely applied
the rules applicable to area searches to searches of the person as well. 58
Searches of the area are justified by the necessity of protecting the arresting officer, preventing the escape of the prisoner, and preserving
proof of the crime." The same necessity justifies a search of the person.60 The search of the person must be similarly limited; the fact of
custodial arrest does not change the permissible objects of a search, according to this view.61
One of the purposes of the Fourth Amendment is to prevent arrests which are mere pretexts to initiate searches.12 Thus, each search
must be based on a valid, bona fide arrest to which the search is merely
incident. Where an arrest is only a sham used to make an otherwise
impermissible search, courts have held that both the arrest itself and
the ensuing search are illegal. "[I]n other words, the search must be
incident to the arrest, and not vice versa."63 Since weapons are the
only permissible objects of search in the case of a traffic offense,64 any
search subsequent to such an arrest beyond a frisk raises a reasonable
inference of bad faith on the part of the arresting officer. 5 The reweapons to circumstances where it appears reasonably necessary for the protection of
the officer. See cases cited note 44 supra.
58. Some courts have, as previously indicated, limited the search for weapons to
circumstances where it appears reasonably necessary for the protection of the officer.
See cases cited note 44 supra.
59. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
60. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 265 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969); People
v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 201 n.12, 496 P.2d 1205, 1216 n.12, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837,
848 n.12 (1972). The courts which use this test have recognized that the name of the
conduct the police are engaging in is not the controlling issue, but rather that the determination of reasonableness must depend on the nature of that conduct. To say that the
mere fact of a technical arrest determines the nature of the items subject to seizure is
to put form over substance. See LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MicH. L. REv. 39, 51-52 (1969) [hereinafter cited

as LaFavel.
61. The courts which use this test have recognized that the name of the conduct
the police are engaging in is not the controlling issue, but rather that the determination
of reasonableness must depend on the nature of that conduct. To say that the mere
fact of a technical arrest determines the nature of the items subject to seizure is to
put form over substance. See W. LaFave, "Street Encounters" and the Constitution:
Terry, Sibron, Peters, and Beyond, 67 MICH. L. REV. 39, 51-52 (1969)

[hereinafter

cited as La Fave].
62. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932); Amador-Gonzalez v. United
States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262 (9th
Cir. 1961).
63. Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961).
64. This is of course subject to the exception of driving while under the influence
of alcohol or narcotics. See note 42 supra.
65. If there is nothing to seize, there is no possible justification for a search. The
search in this situation, therefore, must necessarily be motivated solely by the officer's
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lationship test, however, avoids the extremely difficult problem of ascertaining the subjective intent of the officer, 66 i.e., whether he made
the arrest solely for the purpose of conducting67a search, by positing an
obiective test keyed to the nature of the offense.
Traffic Arrests in California
The California Supreme Court has been especially protective of
individual privacy in the traffic arrest situation. People v. Superior
Court"5 (hereafter Simon) and People v. Miller69 set out the California
rules on searches incidental to arrests for minor traffic offenses.
In Simon, the defendant was stopped for driving without headlights or taillights. Unable to produce either personal identification or
the automobile registration, he was placed under full custodial arrest
under the authority of California Vehicle Code section 40302,70 and
the officer proceeded to search his person. A soft plastic bag containing 7.6 grams of marijuana was found in Simon's pants pocket.71
Finding the search unconstitutional, 2 the California Supreme
Court delineated the exclusive objectives of a warrantless search:
[A] warrantless search . . . may be made (1) for instrumentalities
used to commit the crime, the -fruits of that crime, and other evidence thereof which will aid in the apprehension or conviction of
the criminal; (2) for articles the possession of which is itself unlawful, such as contraband or goods known to be stolen; and (3) for
weapons which can
be used to assault the arresting officer or to
3
effect an escape.7
desire to rummage through the belongings of the suspect. The extraordinary difficulty
of proving the officer's state of mind seems clear. Any test which avoids this has the
advantage of certainty in an area where the need for certainty is manifest. Cf. Note,
Search and Seizure-Search Incident to Arrest for Traffic Violation, 1959 Wis. L. REv.
347, 353 [hereinafter cited as Traffic Violation].
66. The extraordinary difficulty of proving the officer's state of mind seems clear.
Any test which avoids this has the advantage of certainty in an area where the need
for certainty in manifest. Cf. Note, Search and Seizure-Search Incident to Arrest for
Traffic Violation, 1959 Wis. L. REV. 347, 353 [hereinafter cited as Traffic Violation].
67. The fleeting circumstances of the arrest thus need not have as central a place
in the determination of reasonableness as they do with the probable cause test.
68. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
69. 7 Cal. 3d 219, 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1972).
70. That section provides, inter alia, that when a person is arrested for a violation
of the California Vehicle Code not declared to be a felony, the arrested person must
be taken without unnecessary delay before a magistrate if he (a) fails to present his
driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of his identity, (b) refuses to give his written promise to appear in court, or (c) demands an immediate appearance before a magistrate. CAL. Va-. CODE § 40302 (West 1971 & Supp. 1974).
71. 7 Cal. 3d at 191, 496 P.2d at 1209, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 841.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 201, 496 P.2d at 1216, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 848, quoting People v. Superior Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 807, 812-13, 478 P.2d 449, 451, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 732 (1970) (Kiefer, real party in interest).

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 26

Since the traffic offense has no fruits, instrumentalities, or evidence,
a search of the person of the arrestee for these items was held unreasonable per se.7 1 In cases of arrest for minor traffic violations, a search
for contraband must be justified by independent probable cause to believe that contraband is in fact secreted on the person of the arrestee. 75
Similarly, a weapons search requires justification beyond the mere fact
of arrest. The California court reasoned that permitting the police to
"search for weapons in all such instances would . . . constitute an 'intolerable and unreasonable' intrusion into the privacy of the vast majority of peaceable citizens who travel by automobile. '76 The court held
that a warrantless search for weapons, like a search for contraband,
must be predicated in traffic violation cases on specific facts or circumstances giving the officer reasonable grounds to believe weapons were
present. 7 7 Thus, incidental searches in California are restricted, both
as to permissible objects7 8 of search and to the occasions when such
limited searches will be permitted.7 9 The court expressly rejected the
reasoning of a court of appeal decision8" that "[iln the case of a valid
arrest the constitutional adequacy of the grounds for search is supplied
by the arrest itself . . .-.
In People v. Miller,82 the California Supreme Court defined the
probable cause standard which must be met in order to justify a search.
Early one morning police discovered Miller sleeping on the front seat
of an automobile parked in an abandoned private parking lot in South
San Francisco. Electronic and musical equipment was visible on the
back seat. A radio check on Miller revealed an outstanding traffic warrant, and solely on this basis he was arrested, handcuffed, and placed
in a patrol car. The equipment and Miller's overcoat were taken into
custody, against Miller's wishes, for "safekeeping." At the police station the overcoat was searched; a marijuana cigarette and a small bag
of unrolled marijuana found in one pocket were used to convict Miller
of possession. 3
In countering Miller's argument on appeal that the contraband was
seized in an unconstitutional search and therefore should have been
74. 7 Cal. 3d at 201-02, 496 P.2d at 1216, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 848.
75. Id. at 202, 496 P.2d at 1216-17, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 848-49.
76. Id. at 206, 496 P.2d at 1219, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 851, quoting People v. Superior
Ct., 3 Cal. 3d 807, 829, 478 P.2d 449, 464, 91 Cal. Rptr. 729, 744 (1970) (Kiefer, real
party in interest).

77.

Id.

78.

See text accompanying note 73 supra.

79.

See text accompanying notes 76-77 supra.

80. People v. Graves, 263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1968).
81. 7 Cal. 3d at 203-04, 496 P.2d at 1218, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 850, quoting People
v. Graves, 263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 734, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509, 519 (1968).
82. 7 Cal. 3d 219, 496 P.2d 1228, 101 Cal. Rptr. 860 (1972).

83.

Id.
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suppressed, the state argued that the search was justified not as incidental to a traffic arrest, but rather on the ground that there was probable
cause to arrest Miller for receiving stolen property. 4 Such an arrest
would have justified the search of Miller's coat. Implicitly recognizing
the relative ease with which probable cause can be manufactured after
the fact of a successful search,"5 the court stated that since the officers
arresting Miller did not in fact have a belief that he had received stolen
property, the state could not be permitted to establish probable cause
on that basis at the trial. The court reasoned that probable cause to
arrest without a warrant represents an objective legal standard by which
to measure the reasonableness and sufficiency of the officer's subjective
beliefs that the defendant had committed an offense; thus, "it would
be a logical absurdity for the courts to be asked to determine the reasonableness of an officer's belief . . . unless it were first established
that the officer did entertain such a belief.""" The thrust of the opinion seems clear: the seizure of a particular item will be validated only
when there has been an arrest for an offense of which the item might
be evidence. This approach effectively prevents the prosecutorial use
of evidence seized following pretext arrests.
The Supreme Court's Categorical Validation
The clear majority of courts which have dealt with the search incident to arrest exception in the modem setting of the traffic arrest refuse
to validate such searches automatically.8 7 The tests of reasonableness
which have been applied-either the requirement of probable cause
or a nexus between the crime and the objects of the search-have recognized that a full search of the person is not ordinarily justified when
there has been an arrest for a mere traffic violation. 8 Realizing the
incongruity of a minor offense and a full-blown search, 9 these courts
have held that the same authorization to search does not flow from all
arrests. 90 Rather, they have felt constitutionally constrained to place
additional limitations on searches in the form of tests which require justification beyond the mere lawfulness of an arrest. Although taking
different theoretical approaches, the courts using the probable cause
test and the nexus test have reached the same practical result: searches
of the person incident to a traffic arrest in ordinary circumstances are
'unconstitutional.
84. Id. at 225, 496 P.2d at 1232, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 864.
85. Cf. 1966 Term, supra note 49, at 121-22.
86. 7 Cal. 3d at 226, 496 P.2d at 1233, 101 Cal. Rptr. at 865, quoting Agar v.
Superior Ct., 21 Cal. App. 3d 24, 28-29, 98 Cal. Rptr. 148, 150-51 (1971).
87. See cases cited note 19 supra.
88. See text accompanying notes 14-86 supra.
89. Searches of the Person, supra note 18, at 875.
90. The test is the same for all searches, but it seems clear that the scope of a
particular reasonable search depends on the facts of each case.
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The United States Supreme Court in United States v. Robinson91
9 2 rejected this approach in favor of a cateand Gustafson v. Florida
gorical validation of searches of the person no matter what the circumstances of the custodial arrest.93 In so doing, the Court declined to
draw on the experience of courts which had previously dealt with arrests for minor offenses similar to those in Robinson and Gustafson. 4
Relying upon dicta from factually unrelated cases,9 5 which acknowledged in passing the right of an officer to search a person incident to
his arrest,9" the Court found affirmative authority to uphold searches limited only by the policeman's discretion9" and the Fourteenth Amendment's prohibition of "extreme or patently abusive" search techniques. 98
91. 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
92. 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
93. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 266 (1973).
94. E.g., Amador-Gonzalez v. United States, 391 F.2d 308 (5th Cir. 1968) (improper left turn, speeding, no driver's license); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d 262
(9th Cir. 1961) (traffic warrant); Grundstrom v. Beto, 273 F. Supp. 912 (N.D. Tex.
1967) (loud muffler); McCurdy v. State, 42 Ala. App. 646, 176 So. 2d 53 (1965)
(speeding); State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d 130 (1962) (speeding); People
v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972) (lights out,
no driver's license); Cowdin v. People, 176 Colo. 466, 491 P.2d 569 (1971) (speeding);
People v. Watkins, 19 Ill. 2d 11, 166 N.E.2d 433 (1960) (parking too close to crosswalk); State v. Sedacca, 252 Md. 207, 249 A.2d 456 (1969) (running a stop sign); People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960) (running a stop sign); State v.
Curtis, 290 Minn. 429, 190 N.W.2d 631 (1971) (defective turnlights, turning without
signaling); People v. Marsh, 20 N.Y.2d 98, 228 N.E.2d 783, 281 N.Y.S.2d 789 (1967)
(traffic warrant); State v. Coles, 20 Ohio Misc. 12, 249 N.E.2d 553 (Ct. C.P. Montgomery County 1969) (no license plate or rear brake lights); State v. O'Neal, 251 Ore. 163,
444 P.2d 951 (1968) (no rear license plate, no valid operator's permit); Commonwealth
v. Lewis, 442 Pa. 98, 275 A.2d 51 (1971) (taillights out); Barnes v. State, 25 Wis. 2d
116, 130 N.W.2d 264 (1964) (brakelight violation).
The United States Supreme Court also overlooked a large body of academic authority which supported scope limitations on incidental searches of the person. E.g.,
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § SS 3.02 (Tent. Draft No. 3, 1970);
Simeone, Search and Seizure Incident to Traffic Violations, 6 ST. Louis U.L.J. 506
(1961); Searches of the Person, supra note 18; Comment, Criminal Law: Personal
Searches Incident to Traffic Arrests-No Nexus Necessary?, 25 U. FLA. L. REv. 239
(1972); Traffic Violation, supra note 66; Note, Scope Limitations for Searches Incident
to Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 433 (1969).
95. Searches of the Person,supra note 18, at 866-70.
96. Id.
97. Since the scope of the search is not limited by judicial standards of reasonableness, whether a search takes place at all and the scope of that search when conducted
are entirely in the hands of the arresting officer. Cf. Traffic Violation, supra note 66,
at 359.
98. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973), citing Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).

November 19741

SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARS

Before Robinson and Gustafson, the Supreme Court had not faced
a direct challenge to a search of the person incidental to an arrest. It
had, however, frequently alluded to such a search as an exception to
These statements
the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement. 9
were merely prefatory to the holdings of the cases, and the Court did
not go so far as to define the permissible scope of such a search of the
person. 100 It is in the dicta of these cases, however, that the Supreme
Court, per Justice Rehnquist, found authority for its proposition that
there is a positive right to conduct a search of the person any time there
is a custodial arrest:
Since the statements in the cases speak not simply in terms of an
exception to the warrant requirement, but in terms of an affirmative authority to search, they clearly imply that such searches also
meet the Fourth Amendment's requirement of reasonableness. 101
Thus, judicial recognition of the fact of the exception was used as a
basis for holding that no further test of reasonableness was required
to determine the permissible scope of the search."0 2 The court
adopted a one step test:
A custodial arrest of a suspect based on probable cause is a reasonable intrusion under the Fourth Amendment; that intrusion being
lawful, a search incident to the arrest requires no additional justification. It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the au-

thority to search ....

103

Exceptions to the warrant requirement have, until the Robinson
and Gustafson decisions, been based on necessity, rather than anything
inherent in the exception itself. 10 Thus, they have provided some alternative protection for the prior judicial determination of reasonableness that is missing. The so-called "automobile exception," first recognized in Carroll v. United States, 02 was based on the impracticability
of securing a warrant because a vehicle sought to be searched could
99. E.g., Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S.
752 (1969); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950); Trupiano v. United
States, 334 U.S. 699 (1948); Harris v. United States, 331 U.S. 145 (1947); Agnello v.
United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
100. Although an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment,
such searches must be "reasonable." Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967);
United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65 (1950); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S.
132, 147 (1925). See generally LANDYNSET, supra note 33, at 108-14; Note, The Fourth
Amendment and Housing Inspections, 77 YALE L.J. 521, 524 n.13, 525 n.20 (1968).
101. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226 (1973).
102. Such careless reliance upon dictum is not unique to this case-it is common
to many Fourth Amendment decisions of the United States Supreme Court. Searches
of the Person, supra note 18, at 866, 870.
103. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235.
104. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 467 (1971); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 72 (1950) (Frankfurter, I., dissenting).
105. 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
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be quickly moved out of the jurisdiction in which the warrant had to
be obtained. 1 6 The probability of escaping search is enough to justify
a warrantless search.10 7 This exception, however, may only be invoked
when the vehicle is seized in circumstances which indicate a need for
quick action' 0 8 and when the police have probable cause to believe that
the vehicle contains contraband. 0 9
The search of the area where a person is arrested is justified by
the need "to remove any weapons [which] the latter might . . . use
in order to resist arrest or effect his escape" 110 and to prevent the concealment or destruction of evidentiary matter."' Given this limited
justification, the search must be limited to the area within the "immediate control" of the arrestee, "construing that phrase to mean the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence."" 2 The search of the area is also limited in its objects:
weapons, instrumentalities, evidence, and fruits of the crime for which
the arrest is made." 3 The "hot pursuit" exception promulgated in
Warden v. Hayden" 4 is similarly justified by necessity: "The Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of
an investigation if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the
lives of others.""' 5 In addition, "[tihere must, of course, be a nexus"" 6
between the items to be seized and the criminal behavior for which arrest was made.
Finally, there is the stop-and-frisk exception permitted by Terry
v. Ohio." 7 Recognizing the danger to police involved in street encounters with potentially hostile citizens,"18 the Supreme Court in Terry held
that when an officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with an
armed and dangerous individual, he may for his own protection conduct
a limited search for weapons, whether or not he has probable cause
to arrest that individual for some criminal offense." 9 Because it must
be " 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered
106. Id. at 153.
107. See 1966 Term, supra note 49, at 118.
108. Coolidge v.New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1971).
109. 267 U.S. at 154.
110. Chimel v.California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. See Warden v.Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 307 (1967); Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S.298, 310 (1921).
114. 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
115. Id. at 298-99.
116. Id. at 307.
117. 392U.S. 1 (1968).
118. Id. at 23-24.
119. Id. at 27.
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its initiation permissible," 120 the21 search can be no broader than essential
to serve its protective function.'
Since there are no instrumentalities, evidence, or fruits of traffic
offenses,: 2 2 the only necessity is protection of the officer. As in Terry,

that protection requires no greater search than a frisk.123 Any search
beyond that
is gratuitous, not justified by the circumstances of a traffic
24
arrest.
Justice Rehnquist stated
that gives authority for the
whether the custodial nature
search permitted. 2 6 In the

that it is the fact of the custodial arrest
search.' 25 The question remains as to
of the arrest justifies the broad-ranging
analogous situation in which the police

have lawful custody of an automobile, the Supreme Court in the past
has required something more than mere possession to justify a search.
In Preston v. United States, 27 the defendant was arrested for vagrancy and his automobile taken into police custody. Some time later
the automobile was searched, and two loaded revolvers were found in
the glove compartment. 2 " The Supreme Court found the search unconstitutional, being "too remote in time or place to have been made
as incidental to the arrest . . .."129 In Cooper v. California,'30 how120. Id. at 19, quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Fortas, J.,
concurring).
121. 392 U.S. at 20.
122. 414 U.S. 218, 237 (1973); People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 201-02, 496
P.2d 1205, 1216, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837, 848 (1972).
123. In Terry v. Ohio, the Supreme Court adopted the following definition of a
frisk: "'LT]he officer must feel with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner's
body. A thorough search must be made of the prisoner's arms and armpits, waistline
and back, the groin and the area about the testicles, and the entire surface of the legs
down to the feet."' 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1968), quoting Priar & Martin, Searching and
Disarming Criminals, 45 J. CluM. L.C. & P.S. 481 (1954). A carefully conducted
search is substantially certain to uncover any weapons on the person of the arrestee.
United States v. Robinson, 471 F.2d 1082, 1099-1100 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd, 414 U.S.
218 (1973). The Supreme Court in reversing did not dispute this.
124. For the governmental interest which is sought to be served by a wide ranging
search, see notes 137-38 & accompanying text infra.
125. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235-36 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida,
414 U.S. 260, 263-64 (1973).
126. Each exception to the warrant requirement bears a heavy burden of justification. The exceptions are "jealously and carefully drawn." Jones v. United States, 357
U.S. 493, 499 (1958). There must be "a showing by those who seek the exemption
... that the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative." McDonald v.
United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). "'FMhe burden is on those seeking the exemption to show the need for it ...... United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951)
(citation omitted).
127. 376 U.S. 364 (1964).
128. id.
129. Id. at 368.
130. 386 U.S. 58 (1967).
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ever, the Court validated the search of an automobile conducted one
week after the arrest of the defendant. In Cooper, the defendant was
arrested on a narcotics charge and evidence showed that his automobile
3
had been used to carry on his narcotics possession and transportation.1 1
State law required that the vehicle "be held as evidence until a forfeiture has been declared or a release ordered."13
The Court distinguished Preston and validated the search on the basis of the relationship
between the crime and the search.
The Court reasoned that in Preston the purpose for which the police had custody of the defendant's car was totally unrelated to the vagrancy charge for which they had arrested him, and so was their subsequent search of the car. In Cooper, on the other hand, the officers
seized the defendant's vehicle because they were required to do so by
state law, based upon the nature of the crime for which the arrest was
made. Their subsequent search of the car "was closely related to the
reason [Cooper] was arrested, the reason his car was impounded, and
the reason it was being retained," and was therefore reasonable." 3
Thus, in the case of automobiles in custody of the police the Court has
adopted the nexus requirement
as the standard of reasonableness under
34
the Fourth Amendment.
The Constitutional Balancing of Interests
Exceptions to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment
must meet a test of reasonableness which requires a balancing of the
government's need to conduct the search against the invasion of privacy
which the search entails." 5 Since in a traffic offense there is no evidentiary matter and the protection of the officer could be accomplished
by a much less intrusive search, 136 the only "need" the government has
which may be satisfied by an unlimited search is the enforcement of
37
the law by a conviction resulting from the discovery of contraband.
131. Id.
132. CAL. HEALTH & S. CODE § 11611 (West 1964), repealed, Cal. Stat. 1967, ch.
280, § 1, at 1437, quoted in Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 60 (1967).
133. 386 U.S. at 61.
134. This is the case when the search is based on the fact of custody alone. A
different rule applies when a vehicle is seized upon probable cause. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925).
135. Camara v. Municipal Ct., 387 U.S. 523, 537 (1967); cf. Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 354 (1967).
136. See notes 122-23 & accompanying text supra.
137. This, of course, ignores the fact that the Fourth Amendment is designed to
protect the innocent and guilty alike. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925).
Consider also this statement from Weeks v. United States: "The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not
to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor

and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the
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The Court in Robinson acknowledged that this is, in fact, the interest
the government has at stake:
An arrest is the initial stage of a criminal prosecution. It is intended to vindicate society's interest in having its laws obeyed, and
it is inevitably accompanied by future interference with the individual's freedom of movement ....138
The government's interest, then, is an occasional conviction resulting
from a search of a person incident to arrest for a minor -trafficviolation.
Balanced against this governmental interest is the individual's interest in privacy which the Fourth Amendment was designed to protect.' 3 9 Even the limited frisk is a major invasion of privacy. As Chief

Justice Warren described a frisk in Terry, "[ijt is a serious intrusion
upon the sanctity of the person, which may inflict great indignity and

arouse strong resentment, and it is not to be taken lightly."' 40 Surely

the full search authorized by Robinson and Gustafson is no minor addi-

tional intrusion beyond this.' 4 '
Possible Abuse

Although searches based upon pretext arrests are unconstitution-

al,'142 the Court's one step test of reasonableness-whether there was

a lawful arrest-is an invitation to abuse. Since any search of the person is ipso facto reasonable,' 43 absent conduct that "shocks the conscience,"'1 4 4 a determination of the officer's purpose in effecting the arrest will not be relevant. Police will not need to have probable cause
land." 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914). It appears that the governmental interest the Court
is placing in the balance is the chance to bring the guilty to punishment. This is to
be balanced against the great principles of the Fourth Amendment requiring each
search conducted without a warrant bear the burden of justification. United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951); United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 65-66 (1950);
McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948).
138. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 228, quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 25-26 (1968).
139. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52 (1967); Camara v. Municipal Ct.,
387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
140. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 (1968).
141. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 766 n.12 (1969); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1968). The mere statement of the interests at stake makes the misapplication of the balancing test clear. The Court permits an extremely intrusive search
in the hopes that some serious criminals will be found among the multitude of otherwise
law-abiding traffic law violators.
142. United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 467 (1932); Amador-Gonzalez v.
United States, 391 F.2d 308, 313 (5th Cir. 1968); Taglavore v. United States, 291 F.2d
262, 265 (9th Cir. 1961).
143. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 226, 235 (1973); Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260, 263, 266 (1973).
144. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236, citing Rochin v. California, 342
U.S. 165, 172 (1952).
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to arrest a person suspected of serious criminal activity: they may make
an arrest on a minor charge and conduct a search for evidence of the
more serious crime. 14 5 The abuse of arrest warrants which Justice
Frankfurter noted in United States v. Rabinowitz'4 6 is equally applicable to traffic arrests:
Arrest under a warrant for a minor or a trumped-up charge has
been [a] familiar practice in the past, is commonplace
in the police
47
state of today, and too well-known in this country.
Robinson and Gustafson manifest an unfortunate unwillingness on
the part of the Court to supervise police searches: 48
We do not think the long line of authorities of this court . . . requires such a case by case adjudication. A police officer's determination as to how and where to search the person of a suspect
whom he has arrested is necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which
the Fourth Amendment does not require to be broken down in each
instance into an analysis of each step in the search. The authority
to search the person . . . does not depend on what a court may
later decide was the probability in a particular arrest situation that
weapons or 49
evidence would in fact be found upon the person of
the suspect.
Thus, rather than requiring strict judicial scrutiny of the facts of each
case, the Court chose to lay down a rule which validates intrusive police
searches by a bootstrapping operation; an initial interference with the
individual which requires minimal justification--only probable cause to
believe that a minor traffic law has been violated-is used to justify
a second, more intrusive interference by way of a full search.' 50 This
approach effectively eliminates the protection of privacy against arbi145. Thus the Court goes far beyond the needs of effective law enforcement and
delegates the responsibility for determining proper search practices to the police without
any meaningful guidance. Cf. Traffic Violation, supra note 66, at 359.
146. 339 U.S. 56 (1950).

147. Id. at 82 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). See also Harris v. United States, 331
U.S. 145, 155 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (1947).
148. A determination of reasonableness is necessarily a judicial function under the
Fourth Amendment. The Court's categorical validation of searches of the person abdicates this judicial responsibility.
149. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973).
150. This is despite the apparently well-settled tenet of Fourth Amendment law that
what is found in a search may not be used retroactively to justify the initiation of the
search. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 16-17 (1948); United States v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 595 (1948); Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio At Large in the Fifty States, 1962

DUKE L.J. 319, 336.

But see Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972).

In Adams,

a person known to a police officer approached the officer's cruiser and informed him

that an individual seated in a nearby vehicle was carrying narcotics and had a gun at
his waist. On the basis of this information, the officer conducted a Terry-type search
and discovered a revolver in the place indicated by the informant. The discovery of
the weapon was said to corroborate the informant's other information and thus prove

his reliability, and to justify a subsequent arrest followed by a search which uncovered
heroin on the person of the arrestee. Thus, the information gathered in the first mini-
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trary intrusions by police which is "the core of the Fourth Amendment
[and which] is basic to a free society."''
Whither California?
The United States Supreme Court has created a great deal of confusion in those states, including California, which have restricted incidental searches. 5 s Despite the presence in all the state constitutions
1 53
most
of provisions similar if not identical to the Fourth Amendment,
of the state courts have relied primarily on the federal Constitution and
on United States Supreme Court cases in defining the scope of permissible searches. 154 Some of the decisions have not even made reference
to the respective state constitution, 5 5 and others have not indicated
which constitution they were using as the basis for their holding. 50
The significance of determining which constitution was relied
upon is that state decisions, if based upon adequate nonfederal grounds,
cannot be reviewed by the United States Supreme Court, 5 7 except in
cases where the protections provided by the states do not provide the
minimum protection guaranteed by the federal Constitution. 55 Almal intrustion was used to justify a second greater search. The Court seems overwilling
to validate searches. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966). See Searches
of the Person, supra note 18, at 869 n.23.
151. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27 (1949).
152. See text accompanying notes 18-86 supra.
153. For a full compilation of state constitutions, see CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
UNITED STATES, NATIONAL AND STATE (Columbia Univ. 1974).
154. E.g., McCurdy v. State, 42 Ala. App. 646, 176 So. 2d 53 (1965) (U.S. cases,
express reference to the U.S. Constitution); State v. Quintana, 92 Ariz. 267, 376 P.2d
130 (1962) (state cases, U.S. Constitution); People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496
P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972) (U.S. cases, U.S. Constitution); Cowdin v. People, 176 Colo. 466, 491 P.2d 569 (1971) (U.S. cases, no reference to U.S. Constitution);
State v. Anonymous, 29 Conn. Supp. 153, 276 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct. 1971) (U.S. cases,
U.S. Constitution); People v. Zeigler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456 (1960) (U.S.
cases, no reference to U.S. Constitution); State v. O'Neal, 251 Ore. 163, 444 P.2d 951
(1968) (U.S. cases, no reference to U.S. Constitution); Commonwealth v. Lewis, 442
Pa. 98, 275 A.2d 51 (1971) (U.S. cases, no reference to U.S. Constitution).
155. E.g., McCurdy v. State, 42 Ala. App. 646, 176 So. 2d 53 (1965); Cowdin v.
People, 176 Colo. 466, 491 P.2d 569 (1971); State v. Anonymous, 29 Conn. Supp. 153,
276 A.2d 448 (Super. Ct. 1971); People v. Ziegler, 358 Mich. 355, 100 N.W.2d 456
(1960).
156. E.g., Commonwealth v. Hagan, 464 S.W.2d 261 (Ky. 1971); State v. O'Neal,
251 Ore. 163, 444 P.2d 951 (1968).
157. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). See generally Bice,
Anderson and the Adequate State Ground, 45 S.CAL. L. REv. 750 (1972); Falk, The
State Constitution: A More than "Adequate" Nonfederal Ground, 61 CALIF. L. REv. 273
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Falk].
158. Linde, Book Review, 52 ORE. L. REv. 325, 333 (1973); see Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
This principle of independent nonfederal grounds is applied where the decision is
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though states are free to impose standards more rigorous than those required by the federal Constitution,' 59 most state courts have followed
United States Supreme Court interpretations of constitutional provisions
similar to those contained in the states' constitutions.1 6 The California
Supreme Court, however, has not in the past felt itself constrained to
limit the protections provided by the state constitutions to those mandated by contemporaneous interpretations of the federal Constitution
by the United States Supreme Court.
In People v. Cahan,'6 ' the California court adopted the exclusionary rule six years before being compelled to do so by Mapp v. Ohio.'6 2
In re Johnson1 63 extended the right to counsel to misdemeanor cases
People v. Anderson'6 5 held capital
before Argersinger v. Hamlin.'
punishment violative of the state constitution before the United States
Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia. 6 Cardenas v. Superior Court16 ' held that a mistrial granted on the prosecutor's motion
without the defendant's consent but for his benefit violated the double
jeopardy provision of the state constitution' 68 even though it did not
violate the Fifth Amendment. People v. Hood'6 9 reaffirmed the holding
of People v. Henderson"' that a harsher sentence following a retrial
of a defendant who has successfully appealed a conviction is impermissible under the state constitution, although an intervening decision by
the United States Supreme Court' 7 ' held that a harsher penalty in some
circumstances would be allowed under the federal Constitution. Fibased on state law alone as well as where the state court opinion discusses both federal
and state law and the state grounds are determined to be "independent" of federal law.
Falk, supra note 157, at 275-76; see California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972), aff'd on
rehearing,8 Cal. 3d 623, 504 P.2d 457, 105 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1973); Department of Mental Hygeine v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194, aff'd on rehearing, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d
321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
159. Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62 (1967).
160. Falk, supra note 157, at 280; Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in a State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. REv. 326, 333-34; Paulsen, State Constitutions, State Courts, and
First Amendment Freedoms, 4 VAND. L. REv. 620, 621-22 (1951). Indeed, some courts
have a rule of construction which requires following a United States Supreme Court interpretation of a substantially similar provision. Mazor, Notes on a Bill of Rights in
a State Constitution, 1966 UTAH L. Rv. 326, 334 & n.48.
161. 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d 905 (1955).
162. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
163. 62 Cal. 2d 325, 398 P.2d 420, 42 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1965).
164. 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
165. 6 Cal 3d 628, 493 P.2d 880, 100 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1972).
166. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
167. 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961).
168. CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 13.
169. 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969).
170. 60 Cal. 2d 482, 386 P.2d 677, 35 Cal. Rptr. 77 (1963).
171. North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969).
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nally, the California court in Kaplan v. Superior Court1 7 2 retained the
vicarious exclusionary173rule despite a United States Supreme Court decision to the contrary.
Cahan, Johnson, Cardenas,Hood, Henderson, and Kaplan all rely
solely on state constitutional grounds. Although the California Supreme Court mentioned the federal Constitution's Fourth Amendment
in People v. Superior Court (Simon),7 4 it did not expressly mention the
California Constitution. The question arises, then, as to whether the
decision in Simon resulted from a misinterpretation of the federal Constitution, or whether the same result is compelled by the California

Constitution.
The fact that the wording of the Fourth Amendment and article
I, section 19 is virtually identical 75 is certainly not dispositive of the
question. The wording of the double jeopardy provisions of the federal and the state constitutions is the same and yet the state provision is
held to provide substantially greater protection than its federal counterpart.176 This is also true of the search and seizure provision, in the
retention of the vicarious exclusionary rule by California. 1 77 It seems
clear that state courts interpreting state provisions should follow decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting similar provisions only so far as they are intellectually persuasive.' 78 In its decisions
the California court has indicated that it fully accepts this proposition.
The California Supreme Court has indicated that when it uses the
phrase "Fourth Amendment rights," such rights necessarily include those
guaranteed by the California Constitution. As the court recently
stated:
Although for the sake of convenience we often refer to constitutional guarantees, both state and federal, against unreasonable
searches and seizures under the rubric of "Fourth Amendment"
rights, our decision today is based both upon our reading of applicable federal Fourth Amendment law and our own determination
of the proper construction of article I, section 19, of the California
Constitution.' 7"
172. 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971). Kaplan reaffirmed the
rule of People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755, 290 P.2d 855 (1955).
173. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
174. 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr. 837 (1972).
175. Although the California Constitution uses the phrasing "seizures and searches"
rather than the "searches and seizures" of the Fourth Amendment, they are otherwise
identical.
176. People v. Hood, 1 Cal. 3d 444, 462 P.2d 370, 82 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1969); Cardenas v. Superior Ct., 56 Cal. 2d 273, 363 P.2d 889, 14 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1961).
177. Kaplan v. Superior Ct., 6 Cal. 3d 150, 491 P.2d 1, 98 Cal. Rptr. 649 (1971).
178. Falk, supra note 157, at 283.
179. People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3d 884, 891-92 n.5, 506 P.2d 232, 237 n.5, 106 Cal.
Rptr. 408, 413 n.5 (1973).
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It is possible, then, that unrestricted searches of the person could
be permissible under the federal Bill of Rights and impermissible under
California's Declaration of Rights, although the provisions are similarly
worded. Since the United States Supreme Court has held that the
federal Constitution does not support the construction given it by the
California Supreme Court, 180 the question is now open to the California
court whether it wishes to follow the ill-advised course of the federal
Court or to take an independent stand as it has done so often in the
past.'" If the California court is to maintain its firm commitment to
individual privacy, it will reaffirm the principles enunciated in the
Simon decision when presented with the opportunity to do so, rather
than follow the reasoning of Robinson and Gustafson.
John Kimball Sutherland*

180. Compare People v. Superior Ct., 7 Cal. 3d 186, 496 P.2d 1205, 101 Cal. Rptr.
837 (1972), with United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), and Gustafson v.
Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973).
181. See text accompanying notes 161-73 supra.
*
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